The quantification of problems that actors decide to understand and fix has become central to policy-making. However, this article suggests that critics of this move miss the point if their critique is limited to inadequate methods or inaccurate results. Dialoguing with recent literature on governance by numbers, the article argues that errors are not the issue. Taking development policy-making as an illustration, the article suggests that numbers in policy are increasingly imbued with a reasoning according to which it is only necessary to find "enough" correlation. By looking at "good enough data/methods/governance" in the World Bank and OECD in the context of the "fragile states" agenda, the aim is to show how imperfect methods and objects become authoritative while their imperfection is anything but hidden. As the pursuit of better numbers moves the wheel, the article suggests the need to learn more about authority and power in these dynamics by looking at how errors are a practical, accepted, and ubiquitous element in donors' practices.
People in fragile and conflict-affected states are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other developing countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send their children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before age five . . . (World Bank 2011, 5) Reports on "state fragility" frequently convey as much human misery as possible in just a few lines, punctuated by numbers and comparisons. Practitioners count on the ability to create visualization to provoke action. They believe that, with the help of quantification, policy-makers can easily grasp the many problems of "fragile states," which in turn hastens decision-making and aid allocation. Much of the intensification in these practices can be linked back to the establishment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to their offspring, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and to the so-called culture of Measuring for Results that accompanied such well-known, quantifiable international commitments (OECD and World Bank 2006; PARIS21 2015) . The fact is that in the past fifteen years or so, numbers have become essential to monitoring and evaluating progress toward international development goals. Löwenheim (2008, 256) points out that around 83% of the (numerical) indices in a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sample were created between 1991 and 2006, 50% of which were elaborated between 2001 and 2006 alone. These moves intensified after 2006. Their highest point so far was symbolically illustrated in 2013 by a call made by the High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda: "We . . . call for a data revolution for sustainable development, with a new international initiative to improve the quality of statistics and information available to people and government" (United Nations 2013, 21) . When statistics have become a development goal, we can safely say quantification has taken over development practices. Moreover, we can ask important questions about similar dynamics in many other fields of international politics. Here, thus, the debate on development and the "fragile states" agenda is one eloquent illustration.
Indeed, numerical indicators have become practical and widespread means for visualizing complex problems, as they have the power to lend apparent "scientific objectivity" to sensitive political decisions (Porter 1995; Porter 2012; Hansen and Porter 2012) . 1 In the case at hand, studies that raise questions about power in the development agenda often point at both the simplification of raw data and the naming/classification/ordering that accompanies these numbers as central to their authority (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012) .
Countering the authority of such numbers, there have been two types of approach to the recent quantification/classification in the development agenda: a) practical criticisms of the errors in calculation and aggregation and their impact on aid allocation formulas (Steets 2008; Gut ıerrez San ın 2009; Fabra Mata and Ziaja 2009; Alexander 2010 ; Gut ıerrez San ın, Buitrago, and Gonz alez 2011; Gr€ avingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012); and b) the broader criticisms in IR and related research that seek to identify how the rationale of quantification influences global governance (Fougner 2008; Löwenheim 2008; Jerven 2011; Bhuta 2012; Hansen and Mühlen-Schulte 2012; Porter 2012; Hansen and Porter 2012) . This article addresses these two kinds of approach in the context of the "fragile states" agenda.
On the one hand, the article suggests that errors are very much part of the statistical and development game and that the acceptance of imperfection can tell us much about the methodological, ontological, and epistemological changes to how development issues are currently analyzed. In that sense, studies limited to unpacking errors miss the point and stop short of addressing important questions regarding how imperfection becomes authoritative and what it authorizes. On the other hand, this article draws much from the second kind of critique but also points at some shortcomings. The "type b" critiques, mentioned above, importantly highlight the limited scope of mainstream understandings regarding the role of such indicators-these critics argue that numbers are not mere instruments to be mobilized in order to realize prior programmatic interests (Bhuta 2012; Hansen and Porter 2012) . This is particularly the case since these numbers cannot be contained in their independent wandering; numbers travel and have a life of their own (Rocha de Siqueira 2014). However, I develop three main arguments regarding "type b" contributions. First, I suggest that although these critiques aim to avoid one-way causalities, they lose some of their potential for contributing to expanding understandings of power in IR by not truly considering the role of circular reasoning. Second, these analyses tend to see the authority of numbers in their ability to carry stable realities as scientific truths. On the contrary, however, these numbers gain much authority from their ability to sell not stability but ever-perfectibility. Third, in that ever-perfectibility one can find an acceptance of errors as a crucial part of the game, which makes it important to investigate how numbers allow us to think of "truth" in terms of sufficient diagnoses and solutions, that is, in terms of degrees of certainty. For this, a circular reasoning is central.
Therefore, quantifying and classifying practices constitute what I call a style of thinking and doing political management of "fragile states," one that gains force through the power of practicality. Drawing mainly from Ian Hacking's philosophy 1 In Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry's (2012, 74) words, "[a]n indicator is a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units." A numerical indicator differs from a simple number in that it is an aggregation, which is then labeled as a social phenomenon, allowing comparison and prescription. Henceforth, I use "numbers" and "indicators" interchangeably, meaning in both cases "numerical indicators." and the contributions of varied sociologies of quantification and classification (Hacking 1990; Porter 1995; Desrosières 1998; Bowker and Star 2000; Epstein 2007; Espeland and Stevens 2008; Lampland and Star 2009) , the article suggests that, by being practical, numbers authorize themselves and gain power by continuously reinforcing the view of a world that can be measured. There is circularity in that thinking and doing. Moreover, it is in the way numbers become practical or "socially comfortable" (Bowker and Star 2000) , even when imperfect, that they find their most important source of authority.
I do not claim that this is unique to the dynamics around "fragile states"; only that the latter are, perhaps, uniquely rich in the possibilities generated to study the ultimate impacts of such reasoning. Indeed, here the "fragile states" agenda is but one illustration of a much broader tendency. As the obstacles for data collection and analysis are many in these countries, the "trial and error" (numerical) feature of current development policies is perhaps nowhere more impactful. Most importantly, many of the arguments advanced here can be extrapolated to think about other fields of policy that are governed by numbers. Hence, this should be considered an initial but key step of such analysis.
The article focuses on the development aid provided by the World Bank to socalled fragile states, as the Bank is one of the leading donor agencies in the framing of "state fragility." I also look at the OECD as a major group of donors in terms of volume of resources.
2 I use the case of statistics about Timor-Leste because, as the world's most recently independent country, occupying half an island and having had 70% of its infrastructure destroyed when Indonesia left the country in 1999, it has been a vibrant challenge for development policies, both national and international (Martin 2001) . These are overviews of complex dynamics and, as such, they are offered as stepping-stones for important and more specific questions, rather than as exhaustive accounts. Despite such limits, it is not assumed that these institutions are homogeneous; on the contrary, the sociological approaches that inspired this article, and my own broader research, preclude such understandings. The following overview should therefore be interpreted as a provocation and as an initiation of a certain kind of thinking about numbers.
In the following, I analyze how the style of thinking and doing political management of "fragile states" works and is reproduced. This is linked to how "social comfort," or what we can call practicality, encourages adaptability and the authorization of imperfect numbers and methods. Together, these two streams of analysis lead to the important point that imperfect but authoritative numbers have crucial impacts on the goals sought and, thus, on what is achieved. "Good enough data" authorizes "good enough methods," just as it becomes acceptable to seek some kind of "good enough governance" for "fragile states." The article provides an analysis of power through the circular authority of practicality. This is one step on the way to more work on these relations of power.
Shortcomings in IR Critiques: Embracing Circularity, Imperfection, and Degrees
In their numerical form, indicators diagnose and prescribe (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012) . For instance, take the "out of school children" indicator, so often used to formulate national policy, which both specifies a number of children out of school and indirectly stipulates that no children should be left out. Moreover, when this indicator is used to measure and compare country performance, it prescribes universal (primary) education as a development standard. This is possible because once an indicator is established it can be made commensurate to others 2 The World Bank has undergone radical structural changes in order to deal with "fragile states." In turn, the assistance offered by OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) to "fragile states" has increased 250%, compared to 40% to "non-fragile states" from 2000 to 2011. See Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), December 2013. and further aggregated in such a way that the whole of a country, for instance, becomes amenable to classification, ordering, and ranking (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 2008) .
3 As Espeland and Stevens (1998, 317) state, "commensuration is fundamentally relative." By quantifying on the basis of a common counting unit, "[i]t creates relations between attributes or dimensions where value is revealed in the comparison." Hence, there is a political choice in every step of any quantified comparative exercise, from establishing the counting unit, to deciding how to label indicators (and thus, what is important to measure), to selecting what to compare.
Desrosières listed the challenges of elaborating "good" statistics for socially complex issues while problematizing how to think of such numbers as both real and conventional, that is, both objective and subjective. In his words, there is a constant epistemological tension between taking numbers to represent the real and seeing numbers as constructed by arbitrary political decisions. According to Desrosières, statisticians working on complex political issues "change hats" without realizing it, adapting justifications and pragmatically finding "compromising solutions to ease this tension," depending on the circumstances of measuring. Thus, statisticians in such cases "separat[e] the signifier (the measurement) and the signified (the object to be measured), while linking them by means of varied correspondence terms." With this, the numbers produced become "useful fictions" (Desrosières 2009, 320-21) . This is similar to the reasoning that leads Bowker and Star to talk about constructions that become "socially comfortable," and also similar to that which moves Hacking to claim himself a pragmatic philosopher, even if not a pragmatist (Hacking 2007) . While Bowker and Star (2000, 67) explain their idea by saying, "It just would not be socially feasible to call a donkey a fish, no matter how good your scientific grounds," Hacking (1999) suggests simply that talking about reality complicates things for no purpose at all. We should instead focus on understanding how people are led to explain their own thinking and doing by "what works," that is, how they become comfortable with what they think and do and how practicality is formed (Hacking 2012) . This article draws from this debate, borrowing Desrosières's intriguing question: How do these compromising solutions between real and conventional take place and are practiced? In turn, this means that a sociology of the uses of quantification is needed.
In the "fragile states" agenda, since numbers have the powerful impact of helping decide where vital resources go, they are often contested. While such contestation is important in order to correct possible "sample errors" 4 and to allow room for more data to be produced when needed, in the spirit of the debate discussed above we can say this kind of argument misses the point if critique is limited to such interventions. Three such arguments are important to mention: a) the problem with ambiguity, b) the problem with inconsistencies, and c) the problem with compensation. The rest of this section uses the "fragile states" agenda to illustrate how these problems manifest themselves in policy.
Three Arguments and Three Discussions
Gut ıerrez San ın makes an excellent case for the problem of ambiguity in indexes of "state fragility," a critique that he suggests can be extended to other political indexes. The author speaks of "fragile states" as a prototype. Prototypes, he says, 3 "Commensuration transforms qualities into quantities, difference into magnitude" (Espeland and Stevens 1998, 316) . only fit into the margins of the spectrum and for this reason have to be "transformed in operational terms," using unambiguous terminologies. Gut ıerrez San ın suggests, however, that this was not done with "state fragility" and, in fact, there might be a "ceiling of disambiguation" for such a label, as many terms used to characterize "fragility"-corruption, democracy, inclusive politics-can only be made quantitative by highly subjective evaluations, accompanied by modifiers such as "highly," "almost all," or "good enough." Therefore, encoding and quantifying such evaluations will always be a challenge of a conventional type, to use Desrosières's differentiation. This is made even more problematic when data is missing, which can happen in analyses regarding "fragile states"-"[i]ndeed, there tends to be a fairly good correlation between the quantity of missing data in a database and GDP per capita" (Gut ıerrez San ın 2009, 9). In these cases, numbers are often substituted by banding categories, which are always arbitrary when dealing with complex social issues. One example is very telling: The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rates countries' performance on a scale of one to six according to sixteen established criteria. An official threshold of 3.2 has come to mean countries scoring 3.18, for instance, are "fragile," and countries scoring 3.22 are not (World Bank 2015) . Considering "fragile states" have access to a much more limited fund, these numbers and categories are crucial (World Bank 2014) .
Similarly, Gut ıerrez San ın (2009) points at the problem of inconsistency in indexes of "fragile states" as deriving precisely from the difficulty in separating complex, interrelated political phenomena. Problems of security can be intrinsically bounded to financial issues, trade, and societal relations in difficult ways, so that, for example, establishing strict fiscal policies can indicate "good" economic management but can also put at risk societal relations and the political support a democracy needs. Therefore, averaging interdependent clusters in multidimensional rankings can easily produce inconsistency, to say the least (Gr€ avingholt, Ziaja, and Kreibaum 2012).
Fabra Mata and Ziaja (2009, 18) touch on similar points when discussing the problem of compensation in multidimensional rankings such as "state fragility" indexes. They argue that a necessary attribute of "non-fragility" should not be made compensable by other attributes. Thus, if "security" is a necessary attribute for a country not to be termed "fragile," a low rating on security should not be compensable by a high rating on education, which happens if the total score is a mean of aggregated ratings.
These are all fair and important points. However, these are problems of convention. The interesting aspect of such arguments is that statisticians are often very much aware of these limitations, yet such numbers are still seen as representing a reality for all practical purposes and in the "pragmatic sequences in which the statistical argument plays a part" (Desrosières 2009, 314) . What derives from such a conclusion is often a search for the source of authority of numbers and/or a listing of the powerful political consequences of quantification in these cases. This is precisely what this article seeks to offer. But first, it is important to discuss the shortcomings of studies in pursuit of similar targets.
Circularity
Introducing a special issue on the power of numbers in global governance, Hansen and Mü hlen-Schulte ask two questions that are closely related to that of Desrosières: "Why is it that the criticism launched against numbers usually leads to the creation of purportedly 'better' or 'improved' numbers rather than to their abandonment?" and "Are numbers simply passive vehicles through which more important forces are transmitted, or do they have properties that make a difference in the exercise of power?" (Hansen and Mü hlen-Schulte 2012, 456) . Responding to these questions in the same issue, Porter (2012) argues for an approach that, in his view, is different from both realist and constructivist analyses in IR. He makes use of Actor-Network Theory in order to better "conceptualise the entanglement of power, ideas, people, and material objects in knowledgeproducing networks" (Porter 2012, 534) . His goal is to give a better account of the "growing complexity of transnational actors and relationships" (Porter 2012, 536) which, he argues, state-centrist and norms-oriented approaches cannot do because they provide no room to think of technologies and techniques as mobile and active. ANT, he suggests, opens space for the particular and the individual, emphasizing the "creativity or responsibility" of individual actors. This way, Porter seeks to avoid what he considers a trap present in some critical approaches, such as "type b" critiques: a tendency to interpret the role of numbers in global governance as the reflection of a broader mentality of governmentality.
Porter (2012), answering to Foucauldian approaches to global governance more generally (Fougner 2008; Löwenheim 2008) , argues that they overemphasize the role of broader mentalities in such a way that "coherence is provided by [a] 'way of imagining human life,' which is then carried through into the technical, specific, and local" (Porter 2012, 536 , my emphasis). Porter's argument on this aspect is important, and this article also seeks to show that, contrary to what some Foucauldian approaches suggest, numbers are not tools, direct or indirect, for the application of an already established form of governance. In one such approach, Fougner argues that numbers facilitate governamentality by making other states more amenable to control at a distance, and they do so by way of "pointing and shaming" (in my own words). Numbers are ultimately a "useful mechanism to control the efficiency of government," which thereby come to compete in the international as firms do. Löwenheim's (2008) approach, in turn, is more subtle and focuses on the responsibilization that numbers are capable of mobilizing. By creating and publicizing comparisons of state performance, numbers are capable of "steering choice" (not manipulating or determining) and turning responsibility to the state in question, rather than any other actors.
Nevertheless, the role of numbers goes much beyond these depictions. Numbers have a crucial epistemological role in delimiting how we understand the thing that should be governed. And they have an ontological role that, in effect, relies both on the real and on the conventional. Thus, here are some first indications that the role of numbers goes far beyond instrumental only. I suggest that "type b" critiques do not go full circle, as in fact they should. Circularity is necessary because the reasoning in this form of making policy is circular and this works as a powerful intervenient to the neoliberal techniques often criticized-that is, these techniques do not simply carry power through numbers.
Instability/Imperfection
Critiques of "type b"-those that seek to analyze the rationale of quantificationalso tend to see numbers as different from words, suggesting they have a higher capacity to stabilize truths. In my view, this is intrinsically connected with the general inspiration many of these approaches draw from ANT. However, the stabilization of truths that hold is but a stage of the work of networks, including in the case of numbers. In fact, Latour (2005, 21) once stated: "If the social remains stable and is used to explain a state of affairs, it's not ANT." Hansen and Porter (2012, 413) , for instance, cite the example of the number 83. This number, they say, is more stable than democracy or "even less polysemic words." That, however, in Desrosières's use of the term, would be a purely "realistic" take on the number in question; if used more conventionally, 83 could, for instance, be the score attributed to a country on a scale from 0 to 100 in gender equality. This number could then travel, and be aggregated and judged in different ways in diverse rankings that measure country policy performance. A number has many uses and a life of its own, as ANT followers have pointed out.
Moreover, Hansen and Porter (2012) also suggest that an accumulation of deviation, something that can and often does happen to words over time, space, and usage, is not possible with numbers. Mathematical rules are not superseded by new ones; deviations are "corrected without coercion and do not create alternative practices-instead there is widespread recognition that they are errors or that they are opening a new area of mathematics" (Hansen and Porter 2012, 414) . Nevertheless, the next sections aim to illustrate precisely what an accumulation of deviation can look like in the quantification of the "fragile states" agenda, if we consider that the real and the conventional role numbers play are equally politically powerful. Hansen and Porter (2012) do make use of Hacking's (1999 Hacking's ( , 2006 notions of dynamic nominalism and a "looping effect" to point at the performativity of numbers. Dynamic nominalism as a philosophical ontological 5 position accounts for the interaction of classifications and "kinds," whereby classification does not create what is classified per se; rather, the category itself, with all the elements it is capable of mobilizing, might not have existed in the first place had the classification not taken place (Hacking 2012b, 10-11) . This is a central notion for the arguments made here. Indeed, it is in the practical power of mobilizing a world of thought and action around the measured object itself that numbers and their related categories are able to execute construction, by making its mobilization practical and comfortable. The point here is, in fact, that Hansen and Porter do not follow this dynamic nominalism to the end. Numbers are not stable in conventional terms because they are rarely abandoned as an exercise, that is, they are always on the move. As Hansen and Schulte highlighted, numbers are constantly reworked, even when seen as flawed. In this constant "improvement," dynamic nominalism implies instability. Imperfection and ever-perfectibility combined enable ever-changing categories and truths in an accumulation of accepted errors.
Degrees
I have classified one key critical approach to global governance-Best's (2014) work on "governing failure"-as a "type b" critique, because of its rich illustration of one way in which imperfection is handled in current politics. Best, like Porter, suggests that conventional IR approaches are not able to account for the power of numbers in global governance. She suggests that "changes in the instrumentspractices, techniques, procedures [rather than norm-governed changes, for instance]-were in fact crucial drivers behind the more substantial changes in global governance" (Best 2014, 70) . Similarly, the changes she identifies, which involve intensified quantification and classification, are said not to be the product of objective failures that resulted in institutional learning. In fact, Best argues, the very results that were accepted before come to be seen as failures now, as the tools used to evaluate them changed. Fundamentally, these methodological changes are brought about by moments of ontological contingency, that is, crises of values. In these moments, professionals find new methods and ground them in new epistemological claims: "It is not just how people frame the world that has changed, but also how they count and calculate and seek to engage with things; a methodological, and ultimately an epistemological, transformation has been underway" (Best 2014, 72) .
5
On this, see Jackson (2011, 27) .
Nonetheless, a reverse reasoning and some nuances to her own depiction of current affairs are equally, if not even more, important to consider. Indeed, the reverse reasoning can be powerful: Some things that were perceived as failures before can be re-edited and accepted now, because failures or errors, with the quantifying and classifying reasoning much in vogue today, make correctness a matter of degree. This is not a minor point to consider. To illustrate this argument, I refer to what Epstein calls niche standardization (Epstein 2007, ch. 7) . Niche standardization creates intermediate categories that are made compatible precisely through their intermediate character. It caters sufficient solutions. Therefore, while critics focus on the problems of a "Western model" of statehood imposed via the measures and rankings of developing states-and mainly of those known as "fragile states" (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008; Nay 2013 )-the niche standardization embedded in the very notion of "fragility" and in its degrees, for instance, is powerful precisely in its ability to adapt standards, for better and for worse.
In the next section, I explore my own theoretical take on the three sets of points raised by developing Hacking's notions of style of thinking and doing and dynamic nominalism, which is in turn related to Bowker's, Star's, and Desrosières's take on practicality. The article will then purposefully come full circle to conclude that circular reasoning is indeed essential if we are to understand the impacts of numbers on the development agenda. The proposed full circle serves the purpose to finally abandon the pretense of causality-either the idea that quantifiers indeed seek causality per se, or the slippage in "type b" critical approaches that look for interdependence without fully acknowledging the circularity in quantifying and classifying practices.
Style of Thinking and Doing: The Practicality of Quantification and Classification
The scope, mobility, and speed of the production of numbers have turned the elaboration of statistical taxonomies into what is perceived as an effective form of historical (and political) account. How one looks at this reasoning and its accompanying methods is central to how one understands what feeds these dynamics.
I look at the layered urge to classify and measure "fragile states" as a style of thinking and doing political management of "fragile states," borrowing Hacking's term for a specific form of inquiring about the world (Hacking 2012) . Hacking is inspired by Crombie's six styles of scientific inquiry, two of which are "ordering of variety by comparison and taxonomy" and "statistical analysis of regularities of populations and the calculus of probabilities" (Hacking 1992, 132) . A combination of these seems to be exactly what the political management of "fragile states" has so far mobilized in the form of a measured taxonomy of statehood. I call the style of thinking and doing political management of "fragile states" the ways of finding out about and fixing "state fragility" that are based on quantification and classification.
Quantified practices of classification follow an increased technological proficiency. Nevertheless, in Hacking's (2006) dynamic nominalism, quantified practices of classification make use of available technologies and foment their development in the same way they measure objects that they help create. Hacking is concerned with the looping effect of classification with interactive kinds-in my own words, things that are socially alive. Although intense human misery is common to so many countries named "fragile," the encoding of this human misery into an indicator of "fragile state," the commensurability in rankings that measure state capacity and willingness to tackle this misery, 6 and the following classification of "fragile states" based on manageable processes-education, financial 6 On encoding, see Desrosières (1998) . On commensuration, see Espeland and Stevens (1998). infrastructure, among so many others-have created a "state fragility" truth that, albeit "apace with contingent events" (Hacking 2012a, 604) , is stable enough to mobilize a huge bureaucratic machine.
What is interesting in looking at these practices of classification, therefore, is that the power to hold in place among other possible styles is drawn precisely from the style itself. Styles are not used because they are good; in Hacking's words, " [t] hey are what we use" and, therefore, "[t]hey become our standards for good reason" (Hacking 2012a, 601) . They are, thus, pragmatically selfauthenticating: They do not rely on "an external canon of truth independent of itself"; they have no foundations.
7 Ultimately, a style of thinking and doing is one that "works" (ibid., 605). Hacking admittedly sees circularity in that, but this is welcome: "The truth is what we find out in such and such a way. We recognize it as truth because of how we find it out. And how do we know that the method is good? Because it gets at the truth" (Hacking 1992, 135 ).
What is stated, then, is that different styles have diverse kinds of reasons (Hacking 2012a, 601) . In that sense, Hacking's ideas resonate with what sociologies of quantification point to as the "socially comfortable" character of numbers in policy, that is, the fact that they usually reflect some kind of common sense about a theme. It is not a coincidence, for instance, that many ranking exercises involve a step where subjective calibration takes place-human beings deciding how to make a set of numbers reflect what they think is reasonable about that reality.
8 Nevertheless, these numbers travel with authority (Porter 1995) and become imbricated in policy, even if the subjective aspect of their origin is never really hidden or negated.
9 Therefore, the fact that ultimately, for consumers, these numbers are perceived as real makes them real in their consequences (Bowker and Star 2000, 53) .
In the following, I analyze the historical embeddedness of statistical reasoning in the social sciences and in policy-making in order to illustrate how perceived errors become authoritative and comfortable, and how in order to understand this we require circular reasoning. This will set the way for the subsequent illustration of this reasoning in the current "fragile states" agenda.
Statistics' Many Successes: Making Science Out of the Unknown
The following paragraphs propose we see the classifying and quantifying reasoning and the "fragile states" agenda as connected by what I call a metaphysics of correlation, one in which connections only need to hint at explanation. This metaphysics of correlation is capable of justifying actions based on what is not known and, at the same time, advocating a flexible management of expectations, moving the wheel of the circular reasoning in these quantifying practices.
What We Don't Know Doesn't Hurt Us?
In the nineteenth century, when the modern conception of probability was being developed, Laplace famously stated that probability was "in part the result of our knowledge, in part, of our ignorance" (Hacking 1990, 111) . Indeed, by then statisticians had succeeded in turning lack of knowledge into science precisely by 7 Like Hacking, I here use "pragmatism" loosely; this is not to be confused with the philosophical pragmatist view. For Hacking's take on pragmatism, see Hacking (2007) . 8 The World Bank's CPIA measuring, for instance, involves professionals calibrating rates of different aspects of a country in terms of how they should "probably" compare to numbers of similar or very different countries. Interview with Rui Coutinho, in charge of the CPIA exercise, World Bank headquarters, Washington, April 12, 2013. 9 For a discussion on "imbrication," see Lampland and Star (2009, ch. 1). quantifying the unknown. Numerically, far from being relegated to the realm of religion, mysticism, or simply uninformed guess, the unknown was also measured and, thus, objective.
According to Hacking, Quetelet's experiment with the bell-shaped curve or normal curve of distribution was largely responsible for a leap from the individual to the general (Desrosières 1998, 72-75 ). Quetelet's normal distribution regarded people as a measurable object: "Where before one thought of a people in terms of its culture or its geography or its language or its rulers or its religion, Quetelet introduced a new objective measurable conception of a people" (ibid., 107). As Quetelet believed in the perfectibility of men, this was the first step to manage the average individual, through social policies that would "preserve or alter" the qualities of a people (ibid., 108). The "average man" had many critics, but still it "stuck" (ibid., 107). This pragmatic conceptual survival mirrors the circular reasoning in the idea of a self-authenticating style of thinking and doing. "When the actors can rely on objects' constructed through conventions of aggregation," Desrosières says, and when "these objects resist the tests intended to destroy them, aggregates do exist-at least during the period and in the domain in which these practices and tests succeed" (Desrosières 1998, 101) .
The "framework of practices" in which an idea of "normal" was born was the framework of medicine, where pathological was a variation in normality, thus, a matter of degree. However, when Comte, in its progressionist approach, transported this notion of normal to politics, it was imbued with a new meaning; it was not ordinary anymore, but a purified state to which everyone should strive (Hacking 1990, 168) .
Managing Perfectibility
Moreover, if the "normal" was something everyone should strive to achieve and if society, existing as a whole, could be perfected, it was necessary then to develop the mechanisms to manage this perfectibility. Therefore, I suggest understanding how variables connected was crucial. As statistical laws became used to explain and predict, along with the bell-shaped curve and its understanding of people and "normality," they took a further step into autonomy (Hacking 1990, 182, 187, 188) , but they were still attached to a "constraint of having to integrate 'external causes'-that is, differently constructed facts" (Desrosières 1998, 132) . The positivist answer to what was then a metaphysics of causality (Hacking 1990, 188) was to develop and advance the conception of correlation, which was made "as real as causes": "Henceforward the philosophical view of the universe was to be that of a correlated system of variates, approaching but by no means reaching perfect correlation, i.e. absolute causality." 10 Correlation indicated how variables related, and the accompanying technique of regression would analyze what that relationship was. It was, in practice, the measurement of the proportion of a variable that could be related to the other one; it was a meager (measured) contribution to "explanation," not more, nor less. Correlation was not perfect causality, but it nonetheless became a new "truth." Indeed, even a high correlation would not imply causation, so in fact correlation merely indicated that certain things happened simultaneously. All the rest was unknown. As a "likely probability" (Hacking 1990, 107) , correlation was measured in the amount of information it could potentially offer. What I call the metaphysics of correlation was not a promise of knowledge but, rather, an authoritative "scientific" acknowledgment of ignorance. And so it remains. Pearson, quoted by Hacking (1990, 188) . Therefore, social statistics became practical by the very force of its (im)perfectibility. How bad can its use be if it never means to offer more than enough truth? The success of the science of the unknown is an essential part of what allows "fragile states," with all their supposed causes, consequences, and proposed solutions, to exist as political truths (among so many others). In the extreme case, "fragile states" offer impossible knowledge, and many possibilities are opened for imperfect knowledge to be not only acceptable but much coveted and powerful.
Filling "State Fragility" with Science: When Enough Is Enough
The "fragile states" agenda is such an eloquent illustration precisely because the political issues that are measured in order to rate such countries are complex and interrelated, so much so that numbers are more often than not knowingly imperfect, and knowledge provided is usually based on a bundle of correlations, as in "increasing the proportion of the population with secondary education from the mean found in [fragile states], 7.791%, to 8.791%, would raise the probability of reform from 1.79% per year to 1.93% per year" (Chauvet and Collier 2004, 8) .
Following the insights on the role of errors, this section focuses on one key feature of the "fragile states" agenda, the idea of "good enough (statistical) data," 11 present in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) practices toward "state fragility." The statistical reasoning that inherited the metaphysics of correlation does not require perfect causality, "real" numbers, or direct indicators (as opposed to proxies), and it values form, visualization, and consumption at least as much as it values numbers themselves. In that context, "good enough data" is practical, acceptable, and authoritative-its provisional character is not a weakness but a scientific acknowledgment of the (temporarily) unknown.
Here we come back to the three key sets of arguments raised at the beginning. While many critics point to errors in quantification, one central consideration is missing. Analysts in general know the extent of the limitations of the numbers they produce, and so do the particular kind of consumers for whom the numbers are produced. Yet, as noticed by Hansen and Mü lhen-Shü lte (2012), these quantifying and classifying practices hold and it is important to understand how this happens.
In the following, I give examples of "good enough data" or what could be seen as "provisional numbers," a kind of number Lampland suggests well illustrates the awareness of producers regarding imperfections. Provisional numbers are different from "regular" numbers in that they are not "referent to stable entities which carry the same meaning no matter what their context" (Lampland 2009, 3) . Their "value" is conventional; it is not in being "real" but in creating acceptable and practical temporary political realities, that is, objects that help investigate other social phenomena, a view that resonates with Hacking's dynamic nominalism (Hacking 2007, 41) . It seems then fit to suggest that the temporary character of provisional numbers or good enough data becomes socially comfortable in the context of the metaphysics of correlation, which stands well among uncertainties. "Idealized conditions are never reached, with the consequence that the need to adjust, accommodate, and re-calibrate is ever present" (Lampland 2009, 8) . With that, ever-perfectibility makes errors an acceptable practice. look into these aspects, the case of the education sector in Timor-Leste is used as an example. The aim here is not so much to show the impacts of good enough data, as I have done this elsewhere. 13 The main goal is to illustrate the practical acceptance of such data and how the metaphysics of correlation leads to constantly adapted standards.
Have you ever had indicators that you stopped using after criticism? One indicator we had to improve or change was related to school enrolment. It wasn't fit for purpose. No data is perfect, all are estimates. The MDGs on Education are not about enrolment, they are about completion, but there are no numbers on completion because there are no indicators. Schools don't usually have this.
14 The indicator on completion is more complex than it may look because it involves data that is often not recorded and because it encompasses other numbers that are usually difficult to collect, such as the number of children out of school. This is even more so in the case of "fragile states," which might not have good systems in place, personnel to collect and analyze data, or resources to conduct the necessary studies (see World Bank 1999; Martin 2001 ).
In Timor-Leste, how do you usually collect data if access to information is sometimes difficult or if there is no infrastructure to help?
We have something, we call it "good enough data approach," like in the case of the Education Management Information System [EMIS], which is relatively comprehensive and reliable. But also the GPE [Global Partnership for Education, a program under which EMIS was developed] process is intended for states with limited capacity, it allows the use of different sources of data when capacity is missing; my team produces some itself.
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The "out-of-school children" indicator serves then as an illustration of good enough data because it is both a widely used indicator on education and a knowingly imperfect one for that purpose. As an indicator, "out-of-school children" is used to shed light on how many children enrolled but never completed the course, either because they failed exams or because they dropped out. Nevertheless, the rate of children out of school is perceived by statisticians themselves as a measurement highly prone to error.
A report by the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), an international consortium ("About GPE"), acknowledges that the "out of school" indicator does not capture irregular attendance patterns and is usually measured either through administrative records or household surveys, both only good enough for the task. Administrative records can be biased through over-or under-reporting, can contain errors transplanted from census-based projections (based on inferences and correlations regarding the whole of the population), and only reaches formal education. Household surveys, in turn, are not specially designed to target education, and measurements regarding the rate of out-of-school children can ignore erratic attendance or non-attendance after enrollment (Global Partnership for Education 2012, 8, box 1.1). The GPE tested the use of household surveys to measure the rate of out-of-school children in an Indian district and shockingly registered a "strong underestimation" of more than 50% (ibid.). Yet, not only is "out-of-school children" a constantly used indicator in most development indices, it can also be a crucial one. 
The " Good Enough" Chain Reaction
The rate of out-of-school children has an important impact, for instance, in the M&E of the outcomes produced by a GPE project in any partner country, as it is one of the indicators in the cluster of education. Thus, in the case of Timor-Leste, where the World Bank is the GPE Supervisor Entity, the performance of projects on education, including the GPE one for whose measure good enough indicators like "children out of school" will be rated, can impact the overall rating attributed to the performance of the country in the CPIA (see Global Partnership for Education, "Board of Directors"). It can, thus, result in the country being classified as "fragile," as Timor-Leste, for example, currently is. 16 This, of course, has crucial influence over funds. 17 In the World Bank's IDA Resource Allocation Index (IRAI) exercise, CPIA ratings for all criteria are gathered in four clusters (economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion, public sector management and institutions), cluster ratings are averaged, and these averages feed into the formula that determines the country's final CPIA score, which in turn feeds into the final IDA resource allocation (see figure 1 ).
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Ultimately, therefore, even if subtly, good enough data can have an important influence over the classification of countries as "fragile states" and over the volume of aid allocated to them.
19 Actors in this context improvise with numbers, make subjective decisions, and are willing to accept what the context allows, while at the same time molding this very context by authorizing different standards of data-an adaptation that takes place by comfortably adapting to the limits of data possibility. Producers do not need to believe these numbers reflect "the truth," nor do consumers. These numbers are "socially comfortable"; they follow a style of thinking and doing that has become common sense. When the very reasoning is that errors are not a problem as long as they are accounted for and measured, provisional numbers are a natural part of the data. Moreover, these good enough numbers travel and are reused, despite their provisional character. On that note, the next section clarifies how good enough data feeds good enough methods.
For Each Context Its Own Methods
The ever-perfectible character of certain political numbers and the ephemeral correlation they point at authenticate each other by adjusting standards toward compatibility-not perfection. After all, in the absence of external canons of truth-in this context, practically abandoned with causality-measurements in use become the very "standards of good reason." In the case of the "fragile states" agenda, limitations in data are ubiquitous; meanwhile, methods do not die out, they adapt to modified standards that they help create by delineating their own limitations.
16
In the World Bank's FY2016 Harmonized List of Fragile Situations, Timor-Leste was rated 3.058, that is, below the 3.2 threshold. However, it now has blend status for financing, not depending on IDA concessional funds only. See World Bank (2015) .
17
For a detailed analysis, see Rocha de Siqueira (2014) . See also World Bank (2015); International Development Association (IDA) (2013).
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International Development Association (IDA) (2013). In the figure, note that IDA stands for International Development Assistance, one of the institutions that compose the World Bank Group. It is dedicated to financing the poorest countries.
19 Jerven (2011) has pointed to a similar chain reaction of grave political proportions in his analysis of the numbers that ultimately led the world to see Africa as a dummy in world's history of economic growth.
Quality Is Relative
Identifying appropriate indicators on FCS (fragile and conflict-affected states) -related issues that can be used in a project results framework could be a challenging task. First, indicators usually refer to broad concepts such as fragility, resilience, peace, and/or stability that are difficult to measure. Second, indicators are influenced by numerous elements in the project context. Third, observable changes in FCS context are normally a long-term undertaking. Nevertheless, project teams should explore the possibility to find and identify indicators relevant to their projects and whether changes in those indicators may be attributable to the project interventions (World Bank 2013, 17, my emphasis) .
The guidebook quoted above was prepared by the World Bank to frame M&E practices. It details how to adapt methods for application in "fragile states." The overall reasoning, as expressed in an OECD document, is that now the "[q]uality [of data] is defined as 'fitness for use' in terms of user needs." Moreover, the same document suggests that "[t]his definition is broader than has been customary [sic] used in the past when quality was equated with accuracy" (OECD 2012a, 7) .
This move does not so much make inaccuracy acceptable but flexibilizes the understanding of quality itself. The quality of data and method in the context of "fragile states" is seen also as a matter of capacity to absorb data: "The quality characteristics of most importance depend on user perspectives, needs and priorities" (ibid.). In this flexibilization of standards in method and data, timeliness and accessibility are two fundamental ideas, said to be especially relevant in the case of "fragile states."
How is data analyzed in the context of your work in the field?
We provide briefs, what we call just-in-time reports . . . so that they can be used in the way that is more relevant to the country. In my view, there is always a problem: Rigorous standards of analysis and presentation can be at the expense of the accessibility for the clients. The priority in doing best-quality products means that there may be less likelihood that clients will read the reports.
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Adaptability is still an incipient process, and donor representatives are clearly hesitant in using any official terminology that might indicate "inaccuracy." However, the flexibilization of practices is increasingly patent in official documents and is certainly clearly expressed by staff in terms of common-sense decisions-practical sense-routinely taken and tacitly accepted, as the interview above highlights. An OECD document well summarizes these elements: "Where causality cannot be reliably determined using rigorous methods, evaluators may present plausible explanations for their conclusions regarding impact, though limitations should be made explicit" (OECD 2012b, 68, my emphasis) .
Again, the issue in evidence is not so much perfect accuracy but adequately adjusted methods. Moreover, as argued, actors live these limitations in their everyday work life. In fact, the practicality that leads staff to adapt methods in the field reflects an understanding of what "fragile states" are and how to remedy "state fragility" as much as it contributes to shape these ideas. The missing link is thus how these adaptable standards in data and method culminate in the "flexibility" or "tailoring" of expectations, that is, how they become real in their consequences. The remedies proposed can be packed together under what came to be known as "good enough governance." "Good Enough Governance": Fit for "Fragility"
In the style of thinking and doing political management of "fragile states," the flexibility of the method is connected to the flexibility of the solutions proposed. The imperfection of quantification and the imperfection of classification hold hands, and by doing so the imperfection recreates itself; it limits the reality of what it measures by managing expectations of how this reality can be transformed.
It is important to note that the "routines of encoding and taxonomy" (Desrosières 1998, 307) produced in practices of quantification allow for the political existence of different categories of "states," numerically and, thus, minutely differentiated. The increasing volume of quantified analyses regarding "fragile states" allows for more "granular" 21 categorizations or niche standardizations and, thus, also has an impact on the kinds of solutions that become proposed and accepted. In turn, more specific categories invite efforts to refine and tailor practices toward these groups; hence, more statistical analyses are produced. In this context, "good enough governance" is a specific remedy for a particular categorical banding.
Good Enough Governance
The idea of "good enough governance" is expressed throughout documents and informal settings, although diversely named. Central to it is the notion of "tailoring," that is, making problems and solutions compatible. The term "good enough governance" itself was used in 2002 by Merilee Grindle in a study commissioned by the World Bank. The purpose was to discuss how development aid could prioritize interventions, rather than expecting full accomplishment of many perfect tasks at once. A long list of disordered and "unrealistic" (Grindle 2004 , 525) expectations, Grindle said, would only hinder the goal of poverty reduction. "Good enough governance" would be "a condition of minimally acceptable government performance and civil society engagement that does not significantly hinder economic and political development and that permits poverty reduction initiatives to go forward" (Grindle 2002, 2, my emphasis) .
Interestingly, in a 2007 revision of her first article on "good enough governance," Grindle (2007, 555) takes issue precisely with methodology: "Methodological choices about how to study the issue of governance and development have considerable impact on findings." She suggests that in the rush to transform academic research into policy, reports "short-change methodological and empirical ambiguities," and she argues it is not a given at all, for example, that good governance contributes to growth and poverty reduction (ibid., 561). Yet, Grindle does not propose a dismissal of quantifying M&E practices; in fact, she says, analysts, including herself, seem to agree that "although the measurement of good governance is problematic and inexact, it is worth the effort to attempt such work in order to clarify thinking and to set a basis for cross-national and longitudinal comparisons" (ibid., 555, my emphasis).
Grindle proposed that the different levels of "fragility" be used as signposts to calibrate intervention and, thus, to determine the contents and limits of "good enough governance." Thus, in her words, "practitioners concerned about matching
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A much-favored word in interviews with statisticians. interventions to the [quantified] characteristics of particular countries might begin by assessing the strength and coherence of the state in the particular country" (ibid., 562, my emphasis.) In different phrasings, the idea took off, not just born out of Grindle's texts, of course, but also borrowing from the 1990s and early 2000s debates on aid effectiveness.
22 "Matching," "tailoring," and "fitting" became common verbs, just as "realistic" became a necessary virtue of evaluation and evaluators. Thus, in 2009, a World Bank document stated: "Governance reform in fragile and conflict-affected environments must be built on realistic objectives and context-specific approaches" (Agborsangaya -Fiteu 2009, 3, my emphasis) .
The need to be "realistic" resonates with Hacking's pragmatic stance on reality: "New ways to tell the truth about X change our conceptions about X," and viceversa (ibid., 605). Hence, being "realistic" is practical and self-evident. From good enough data, practicality culminates in "good enough governance"-which, in a welcome circularity, as Hacking says, goes back to good enough data and methods, reinforcing the reasoning (Hacking 2012) . In a looping effect, object and knowledge about the object walk together: Numbers, classification, and intervention are "of a piece" (Hacking) .
This "good enough chain" can be seen as an example of "niche standardization" (Epstein 2007, 7) . To "fragile states," "good enough governance"; to "good enough governance," the "best fit methods"; to the "best fit methods," "good enough data." The reasoning in degrees reverberates everywhere in the line. While some critics focus on the "Western standard" being advanced with the labeling of "fragile states," they miss the powerful implications of quantified adaptable and imperfect standards in this imperfect niche standardization.
Conclusion
This article reflected on the status of practical use and authority achieved by statistical reasoning through its ever-perfectible character. Reinventing numbers in that context is a reasonable activity, not a rational one (Bourdieu 2008, 138.) . The many epistemic successes of statistical reasoning in the nineteenth century contributed to turn statistics into a powerful and practical tool by turning uncertainty and error into reasonable science. The possibility raised by the transplantation of what I called the metaphysics of correlation to the social sciences was that of turning disputable and artificial "social numbers" into political truths capable of anchoring policy-making. This article traced the connections between this metaphysics of correlation, "good enough data," "best fit" methods, and "good enough governance." I suggested these elements are intrinsically and powerfully but subtly connected. Because these statistics are not aiming at truth, degrees of certainty offered in a provisional form can be and often are good enough.
As policy-making increasingly relies on quantification to achieve an image of objectivity and neutrality, a discussion on the role of errors, imperfection, and the measured unknown can be extended toward many realms. The key is in two points. First, in acknowledging that actors know about limitations and second, in noting that, self-awareness apart, imperfection travels through practicality and can be powerful in its effects beyond anything originally imagined. Moreover, in order for these crucial points to be made evident, it is essential to concede to circularity. Circular reasoning, as exemplified by Hacking's dynamic nominalism, can help discard those problems that only deviate attention from how numbers have brought about important changes in worldview and power relations. ways numbers can shed light over how we come to accept perceived failures and how we authorize eternal exercises of correction. In a world where policy is increasingly tied to numbers, it is time we worry not so much about looking for errors, but about investigating instead how much power these are able to mobilize if perceived errors are in fact widespread and acknowledged.
